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RULE OF LAW OPERATIONS IN THE
COMBAT ENVIRONMENT: A JUDGE
ADVOCATE’S PERSPECTIVE AS A
LEGAL MENTOR IN AFGHANISTAN
SHOHNA BA SHOHNA
By Thomas J. Bogar
INTRODUCTION

B

efore U.S. and coalition forces can withdraw from Afghanistan and declare the military mission a success, the
Afghan National Security Forces (“ANSF”)1 must first be able
to self-sustain and defend its country from the insurgency that
has plagued Afghanistan for the last ten years. Getting the
ANSF to that level, however, will require significant training,
partnering, and mentoring. As a consequence, training the
ANSF has now become a key component of U.S. foreign policy
for Afghanistan and of the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces
from the region.2 The responsibility for training the ANSF falls
to the greatest degree upon the United States and its coalition
partners through NATO’s principal command, the International Security Assistance Forces (“ISAF”).3
Until February 2010, the Combined Security Transition
Command–Afghanistan (“CSTC–A”), led by the United States,



B.S., May 1985, Dickinson College, J.D., May 1992, Seattle University
School of Law, LL.M., December 1993, Villanova University School of Law,
LL.M., January 2008, The George Washington University School of Law. The
author served on active duty April to October 2011 as a Lieutenant Colonel,
Judge Advocate, U.S. Army, assigned as a legal mentor to the 207th Corps for
the Afghan National Army, Herat, Afghanistan. The opinions expressed are
those of the author, and not those of the Department of Defense or any U.S.
Agency or Department. I want to express my special thanks to LTC Ramon
Torres who helped me finalize this Essay.
1. The ANSF is made of two parts: the Afghan National Army (“ANA”)
and the Afghan National Police (“ANP”). KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 30588, AFGHANISTAN: POST-TALIBAN GOVERNANCE,
SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY 23 (Apr. 15, 2011).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 23–24.
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coordinated the training of the ANSF.4 The CSTC–A was later
combined with the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan
(“NTM–A”), a command primarily focused on building the institutional capacity of the ANSF and training its recruits.5
Key to training the ANSF are partnering, or mentoring,
teams, comprising mentors provided by NATO who pair with
their Afghan counterparts in positions of all ranks—from as
high as the Ministry of Defense, to the Afghan National Army
(“ANA”) Corps, down to the Brigades and Companies.6 Each
ANA Corps, for example, has a Judiciary and Staff Judge Advocate (the “Corps SJA” or “SJA”), who serves as the principal
legal advisor to the Corps Commander.7 As part of NATO’s
mentoring team, a legal mentor, who is usually a field-grade
U.S. Judge Advocate, partners with the Corps SJA and is principally responsible for training him and his staff, together
forming the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (“OSJA”).8 I
served as an ANA legal mentor for the 207th ANA Corps in
Herat for six months in 2011.
Although others have written about mentoring SJAs, very little has been said since 2007.9 Much has changed in Afghanistan since then, not just from an operational standpoint, but
also from a policy perspective, including the significance of the
4. See id. at 23.
5. See id. at 23–24.
6. There are currently seven established Corps throughout Afghanistan:
the 201st, 203rd, 205th, 207th, 209th, 215th, and the 111th Division. JOINT
CTR. FOR INT’L SEC. FORCE ASSISTANCE, AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA)
MENTOR GUIDE 2–21 (2011) [hereinafter ANA GUIDE] (on file with author).
The 201st is located in Kabul; the 203rd in Gardez; the 205th in Kandahar;
the 207th in Herat; the 209th in Mazar-e-Sharif; the 215th in Lashkar Gah;
and the 111th Division in the Capital. Afghan National Army (ANA)–Order of
Battle,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ana-orbat.htm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2012).
7. See ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 2–20.
8. See Daniel J. Hill & Kevin Jones, Mentoring Afghan National Army
Judge Advocates: An Operational Law Mission in Afghanistan and Beyond,
ARMY LAW., Mar. 2007, at 12, 13 n.18. When I left Afghanistan in October
2011, there was one Canadian Army Major serving as a legal mentor, two
U.S. Navy Commanders, one U.S. Air Force Colonel, and three U.S. Army
Lieutenant Colonels.
9. See Hill & Jones, supra note 8; Sean M. Watts & Christopher E. Martin, Nation-Building in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified in Military Justice
Reform, ARMY LAW., May 2006.
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mentor mission. For these reasons, I consider it important to
revisit the topic and include my experience and lessons learned
to benefit future Judge Advocates deploying as ANA legal mentors.
Before deploying as ANA legal mentors, Judge Advocates
should understand some basic concepts needed for a successful
mission. Because legal mentors will interact frequently with
the ANA (not just with the SJA, his staff, and the judges, but
also with many non-legal ANA officers, including the Corps
Commander), they should have a good understanding of Afghan history and culture, the ANA military and civilian legal
systems, and some basic Dari.10 A cursory understanding of
these topics will not be enough for mission success, because
laws do not exist in isolation. They are shaped by the political,
cultural, and economic characteristics of the society to which
they apply. Previous mentors have learned that a lack of cultural awareness can be a major obstacle to mission success.
Consequently, legal mentors must gain insight into Afghan social norms and nuances for rule of law programs to succeed.
Part I of this Essay provides some basic background information for deploying Judge Advocates; Part II addresses significant challenges that ANA legal mentors face; Part III suggests
solutions or approaches to those challenges; and finally, a Conclusion offers some closing remarks.
I. BACKGROUND
As previously mentioned, NATO’s top command in Afghanistan is ISAF, currently commanded by U.S. Army General

10. This Essay is not intended to provide the requisite level of understanding on these topics for prospective ANA legal mentors. Rather, it is intended
to provide a brief overview so Judge Advocates can continue their course of
self-study before deploying. To learn more about the topics, see generally
THOMAS BARFIELD, AFGHANISTAN: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY (2010);
EHSAN M. ENTEZAR, AFGHANISTAN 101: UNDERSTANDING AFGHAN CULTURE
(2007); MARTIN EWANS, AFGHANISTAN: A SHORT HISTORY OF ITS PEOPLE AND
POLITICS (2002); SETH G. JONES, IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES: AMERICA’S
WAR IN AFGHANISTAN (2009) (discussing the rise of the insurgency in Afghanistan from a historical and structural perspective); BARNETT R. RUBIN, THE
FRAGMENTATION OF AFGHANISTAN: STATE FORMATION AND COLLAPSE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 2002); STEPHEN TANNER, AFGHANISTAN: A
MILITARY HISTORY FROM ALEXANDER THE GREAT TO THE FALL OF THE TALIBAN
(2002).
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John Allen.11 The task of training the ANA falls squarely on
ISAF.12
According to its mission statement, ISAF “conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in
order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability
that is observable to the population.”13 Subordinate to ISAF are
two commands, each led by a U.S. Lieutenant General: NTM–A
and ISAF Joint Command (“IJC”).14
On the one hand, NTM–A “oversees [the] training and equipping of Afghan [security] forces throughout Afghanistan.”15 It
also develops military doctrine for the ANA and provides highlevel training, via defense colleges and academic institutions,
for ANA senior officials.16
At the operational level, Operational Mentor and Liaison
Teams (“OMLTs”) mentor ANA troops by focusing on building
the capability and scope of the ANA.17 OMLTs are essentially
multi-disciplinary ISAF military forces that fall under the purview of IJC. By “co-ordinating the planning of operations and
ensuring that the ANA units receive necessary enabling support,” OMLTs provide training, mentoring, and liaison services
between ANA and ISAF forces.18 In October 2010, 150 OMLTs
11. See About ISAF: Leadership, INT’L SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE,
http://www.isaf.nato.int/leadership.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
12. See About ISAF: Mission, INT’L SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE,
http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
13. Id.
14. Subordinate Commands, INT’L SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE,
http://www.isaf.nato.int/news/5.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). The NTM–A
was formerly known as the Combined Security Transition Command (CSTC–
A). See supra text accompanying notes 4–5.
15. NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, INT’L SECURITY ASSISTANCE
FORCE,
http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/nato-trainingmission-afghanistan/index.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
16. RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE FOR JUDGE
ADVOCATES 71 (Ctr. for Law & Military Operations, The Judge Advocate
General’s Legal Ctr. & Sch., U.S. Army ed., 4th ed. 2010), available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/rule-of-law_2010.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Public Diplomacy Div., Fact Sheet: NATO’s Operational Mentor and
Liaison Teams (OMLTs), N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (June 2010),
http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/factsheets/omlt-factsheet.pdf [hereinafter Pub-
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were operating within Afghanistan, seventy-six of which were
from the United States.19
On the other hand, the IJC “conducts population-centric
comprehensive operations to neutralize the insurgency in specified areas, and supports improved governance and development
in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable peace.”20
Thus, while NTM–A and OMLTs are ISAF’s training and
equipping arm, the IJC is ISAF’s operational arm.21 As a comparison, Judge Advocates deploying as ANA legal mentors are
detailed to IJC as part of ISAF’s operational arm in much the
same way the ANA Corps SJA is part of the ANA operational
arm.
A. A Brief History of Afghanistan
Afghanistan has on more than one occasion been referred to
as the “graveyard to empires.”22 History explains how it has
earned this moniker.
Since the time of Alexander the Great, Afghanistan has been
the battleground for several empires and the crossroads for
many conquerors.23 The nineteenth century and the beginning
of the twentieth century saw Afghanistan as a critical strategic
piece to the “Great Game” played between Russia and Britain.24 It was then that Afghanistan engaged in three Anglo-

lic Diplomacy Div., Fact Sheet]. Each OMLT team is staffed with eleven to
twenty-eight personnel from one to several countries. Id.
19. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 24. For the ANP, the partnership teams are
called the Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (“POMLTs”) and
are staffed with fifteen to twenty personnel each. Id. In October 2010, 317
POMLTs were operating in Afghanistan; 279 were from the United States.
Id.
20. ISAF Joint Command, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE,
http://www.isaf.nato.int/subordinate-commands/isaf-jointcommand/index.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
21. Id. OMLTs also serve as liaisons between coalition forces and ANA
forces during operations. Public Diplomacy Div., Fact Sheet, supra note 18.
Perhaps it is because the OMLTs serve as liaisons for operations that they
are part of IJC.
22. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 1.
23. JONES, supra note 10, at xxv–xxviii; KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 1.
24. JONES, supra note 10, at xxvi; KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 177–82.
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Afghan wars, which eventually led to Afghan independence
from Britain on August 8, 1919.25
During the middle of the twentieth century (1933–1973), Afghanistan was ruled by King Mohammad Zahir Shah.26 Under
his rule, Afghanistan adopted a constitution, formed a national
legislature, and afforded women unprecedented freedoms.27 It
was also during this period of relative peace when King Zahir
allied Afghanistan with the Soviet Union.28 Through its political and arms-purchase relationship with Afghanistan, the Soviet Union built large infrastructure projects throughout Afghanistan, inter alia, the north-south Salang Pass/Tunnel and
Bagram airfield, many of which remain today.29
Following a bloodless coup in 1973,30 the country succumbed
to instability “when diametrically opposed Communist Party
and Islamic movements grew in strength.”31 The instability
mounted until December 27, 1979, when the Soviet Union sent
troops into Afghanistan to prevent Islamic militias, or mujahedin, from seizing power.32 For the next twenty years, Afghanistan remained in an almost continuous state of armed conflict.33
In the years following the Soviet defeat in 1989, civil war
among formerly allied mujahedin leaders caused the destruction of most of the country’s infrastructure.34 The constant
state of war and lawlessness created an ideal situation for the
Taliban to seize power by promising to restore order in exchange for rule (1996–2001).35

25. KATZMAN supra note 1, at 1; see also BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 115–
46, 181–82; JONES, supra note 10, at 6–8; RUBIN, supra note 10, at 19, 47–54.
26. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 1.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id.; see also BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 209–10; JONES, supra note
10, at 9; RUBIN, supra note 10, at 65–66; TANNER, supra note 10, 225–27.
30. TANNER, supra note 10, at 229.
31. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 2.
32. Id.; see also BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 211, 234; JONES, supra note
10, at 11–19; TANNER, supra note 10, at 229–35.
33. See JONES, supra note 10, at xii–xiii; TANNER, supra note 10, at 243–
287.
34. See BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 6; JONES, supra note 10, at 41–43, 49–
51; TANNER, supra note 10, at 269–83.
35. See BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 6–7; KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 5;
TANNER, supra note 10, at 279–87.
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The presence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s
refusal to extradite bin Laden for his complicity in the 9/11 attacks led to the eventual U.S. invasion and removal of the Taliban from power. More than ten years later, the United States
and its NATO allies remain locked in Afghanistan.36
These last thirty years of war in Afghanistan are well documented and have left the country with a weak central government and an economy that ranks as one of the worst in the
world.37 Afghanistan today remains largely dependent on foreign aid,38 with little to no infrastructure, scant potable water,
scarce electricity, and a citizenry plagued with meager health
conditions and little or poor medical care.39 In all, 40% of the
country is unemployed, 72% is illiterate,40 and less than 15% of
the land is arable, all leading to a significant reliance on an
opium trade that supplies 80% of the world’s opium and accounts for 60% of Afghanistan’s GDP.41
B. The Culture: A Basic Foundation
It has often been said that a people’s culture develops from
its history and that culture, in turn, defines a people. Just as it
is important to know its history, understanding Afghanistan’s
culture may help mentors understand why Afghans act a certain way or even anticipate how they may act.42
Attempting to define Afghans as one homogeneous culture
would be an oversimplification of a very complicated reality;
there are just too many variations of ethnicity, tribes, subtribes, and villages.43 Thus, rather than learn cultural nuances,
the study of which could take years of training, legal mentors
should instead try to grasp and understand cultural commonal36. BARFIELD, supra note 10, at 318–20, 333–36.
37. Cent. Intelligence Agency [CIA], Afghanistan, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (last
visited Oct. 29, 2012).
38. Id.
39. Lieutenant Commander Vasilios Tasikas, Developing the Rule of Law
in Afghanistan: The Need for a New Strategic Paradigm, 7 ARMY LAW. 45, 52
(2007).
40. CIA, supra note 37.
41. Tasikas, supra note 39 at 52.
42. Afghan Culture: Observations, Insights, and Lessons, AFG. CULTURE
NEWSLETTER (Ctr. for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.), Sept.
2010, at 67, available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/10-64/10-64.pdf.
43. See id.
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ities particular to the region to which they are assigned.44 The
location of the ANA Corps to which a mentor is assigned will be
indicative of the prevalent ethnicities, tribes, and villages present in the Corps.
For instance, in Afghanistan these commonalities include the
following:
[1] [t]ribal and Islamic cultures are traditional and conservative[;]
[2] [t]ribal codes (honor, revenge, and hospitality) are social
controls[;]
[3] [t]ribal identity and loyalty . . . take precedence over individual identity and private loyalty)[;]
[4] [s]elf-interest and personal gain outweigh the fear of retribution or legal/punitive action and hypocrisy or loss of respect[;]
[5] [a Jirgah or a Shura often make decisions, depending upon the circumstance;]
[6] [t]he most important duty of an Afghan man is to defend
and control his assets: women, gold and land[;]
[7] [h]ospitality is an essential aspect of Afghan culture.45

By studying and understanding these cultural commonalities,
mentors will be better prepared to successfully carry out their
mission.
Ultimately, when trying to understand Afghan conduct, mentors should keep in mind that God, family, village, and tribe all
take priority before country or nation.46 Understanding this
crucial concept will go a long way, particularly when encountering widespread government corruption, which is discussed
later.
C. The Law
Judge Advocates deploying as legal mentors should also be
well versed in relevant military and civil Afghan law. Afghanistan’s history of war and occupation has left an indelible impression upon its people, particularly in their failure to apply

44. See id.
45. Id. at 67–68.
46. See ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 1-4; ENTEZAR, supra note 10, at 75–77.
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the rule of law. This is especially evident with the people’s almost cavalier acceptance of high-level government and military
corruption.47 But by knowing Afghanistan’s history and understanding its culture, mentors will soon realize how law has now
become more relevant and why it is as intertwined with Afghanistan’s culture as it is with its history.
There are five sources of law in Afghanistan: (1) Islamic law;
(2) the 2004 Constitution; (3) codes, decrees, and legislation; (4)
international treaties and covenants; and (5) various regulations and orders.48 Above all other laws, however, Islamic law
takes precedence.49 In fact, the Afghan Constitution specifically
provides that “no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of
Islam.”50
The law applicable to the ANA is found in several codes of
military justice.51 Although initially based upon the United
States Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), the ANA
codes have since been revised to instill Afghan culture and
standards.52 The codes, or laws of military justice, were written
to reinforce the significance of the rule of law within the ANA
and emphasize a well-disciplined and combat-ready army.53
Echoing article 3 of the Afghan Constitution, nothing within
the ANA codes can be contrary to Islam or Shari’a; in fact, the
codes specifically permit Shari’a, as well as the Afghan Civil
47. See Kevin T. Carroll, Afghan Corruption—The Greatest Obstacle to
Victory in Operation Enduring Freedom, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 873, 876–83.
48. See Muslim Law Systems and Mixed Systems With A Muslim Law
Tradition, JURIGLOBE, http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/droitmusulman.php (last visited Oct. 29, 2012); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN [AFGHAN CONSTITUTION], Jan. 26, 2004, available
at
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/cms/uploads/images/Constitution/The%20
Constitution.pdf.
49. AFGHAN CONSTITUTION art. 3.
50. Id.
51. See Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 14 & n.24. The Afghan Constitution
removes the military courts from the Afghan civil judicial system. AFGHAN
CONSTITUTION art. 122.
52. See Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 14. Unlike the UCMJ, the ANA military justice codes are not consolidated in one document. Rather, the ANA
military justice code is comprised of several codes, which incorporate by reference the Afghan Civil Code and Shari’a law. Those ANA codes are: (1) Afghan National Army Law of Military Courts (“LMC”); (2) Military Criminal
Procedure Code (“MCPC”); and (3) Military Crimes Code (“MCC”).
53. See Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 16.
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Penal Code, to supplement the ANA codes when offenses are
not specified.54
Three separate provisions make up the ANA military justice
codes, each of which will be discussed in turn:
1. the Law of Military Courts Code (“LMC”), which contains
eighteen articles within seven chapters and determines
the authority and jurisdiction of the military courts;55
2. the Military Criminal Procedure Code (“MCPC”), which
contains sixty-one articles within seven chapters and regulates the criminal investigation process in the military;56
and
3. the Military Crimes Code (“MCC”), which contains fortyeight articles within three chapters and establishes military crimes and punishment within the military.57

The LMC establishes the ANA military court system.58 It defines the roles of prosecutors, military judges, and defense
counsel.59 It also designates primary military trial courts and a
military court of appeals,60 with “exclusive jurisdiction of purely military offenses committed by members of the [ANA].” 61
Appeal from the ANA military court of appeals is made to the
Supreme Court of Afghanistan.62
The MCPC is authorized pursuant to article 8(B) of the
LMC.63 Within its sixty-one articles, the MCPC regulates the
54. AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY MILITARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE [MCPC]
art. 47 (on file with author); see also Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 14.
55. AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY LAW OF MILITARY COURTS [LMC] (on file with
author). The Afghan Ministry of Justice has not yet published or officially
distributed the Law of Military Courts in its Official Gazette.
56. MCPC.
57. AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY MILITARY CRIMES CODE [MCC] (on file with
author).
58. LMC art. 1.
59. Id. art. 8.
60. Id. art. 7.
61. Id. art. 9(A). However, there may be instances when the military
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the civilian courts when “persons
subject to [the LMC] commit acts which are offenses under both military and
civilian law,” or over persons not otherwise members of the ANA. See LMC
arts. 2, 9.
62. Id. art. 15.
63. Although article 1 of the MCPC recites articles 122 and 134 of the Afghan Constitution as its authority, article 8(B) of the LMC empowers the
Minister of Defense with the authority to “establish written procedures and
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“procedures relating to discovery, investigation and trial of duty related crimes” allegedly committed by ANA soldiers,64 much
like the due process articles found in the UCMJ.65
The MCC is more or less a revision of a former Soviet-era military justice code.66 The MCC outlines the elements of various
military crimes, as well as their associated confinement
terms.67 In addition to crimes typical of a military crimes
code—such as desertion, mutiny, and absent-without-leave
(“AWOL”)—the MCC contains crimes specific to Afghanistan,
to wit, corruption and violations pertaining to the operation of
vehicles68 and selling or losing combat equipment.69 Furthermore, the MCC incorporates all crimes punishable under the
Afghan Civil Penal Code and Islamic law.70 In such instances,
jurisdiction may lie with either a military or civilian court.71
For these reasons, legal mentors need to have some understanding of the ANA codes, the Afghan Civil Penal Code, and
basic Islamic law.
II. CHALLENGES WHEN ADVISING THE ANA
A. Advising the ANA—What is Mentoring?
Before discussing the kinds of challenges Judge Advocates
should expect to encounter when mentoring the ANA, it is
probably best to first cover, in greater detail, what it means to
“mentor.”
In Afghanistan, legal mentors provide training guidance,
administrative advice, as well as advice to the SJA and his
staff on routine and non-routine legal matters. Legal mentors
also serve as experts for or advisors to the SJA, OSJA, and
Corps judiciary when cases are complex or potentially involve
political interference, or when help from a third party is needrules of military courts in accordance with the constitution and the laws of
Afghanistan.” Id. art. 8(B); see also Watts & Martin, supra note 9, at 6.
64. MCPC art. 1.
65. Watts & Martin, supra note 9, at 7. For a good overview of the MCPC,
see id. at 7–9.
66. See id. at 9.
67. MCC arts. 9, 12–47.
68. Id. art. 30.
69. Id. arts. 35, 36.
70. See id. art. 47.
71. Id.

250

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:1

ed. Keeping in mind U.S. policy for Afghanistan, the mentor
mission is consistent with the principal objective of developing
each Corps OSJA into a self-sufficient legal office, with the capacity to conduct thorough and impartial internal investigations.72 That, in turn, will lead to good order and discipline
within the Corps’ ranks and eventually to the Corps’ assuming
responsibility for security in its respective region.
The most critical kind of mentoring that legal mentors provide is legal training to the OSJA so that they can then provide
legal training to the ANA soldiers. Some of the topics covered
during training sessions taught by ANA Judge Advocates include the rules of engagement, the law of armed conflict, nonjudicial punishment, and ethics. These issues seem to be the
ones that resonate most frequently through the ANA. Ensuring
each Corps understands and complies with the laws of armed
conflict will better prepare Afghanistan for the day when the
ANA accepts responsibility for the security of all Afghanistan.
Legal mentors also provide administrative guidance. More
specifically, they advise on tasks required for running a legal
office. These tasks may include completing supply requisitions
(a form called a MOD 14 in the ANA system), noncommissioned officer evaluation reports, counseling statements, investigation reports, or statements for non-judicial
punishment.73 Administrative training and advice may also entail showing the ANA how to track and catalogue regulations
and orders or how to organize case management files.
In addition to administrative advice, legal mentors may advise on a number of other matters as well. These matters may
be legal (e.g., strategy for a particular case), political (e.g., dealing with a particular commander who is reluctant to submit to
a criminal investigation), logistical (e.g., difficulty obtaining
supplies through the MOD 14 process),74 or operation72. See Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 17–19.
73. Training the OSJA on these topics is important because they will be
required to complete many of the same forms for their own soldiers or be
asked by other commanders on how best to complete the forms.
74. There have been multiple instances when requisition of simple supplies through proper ANA channels are delayed for months because of the
ANA’s own bureaucratic inadequacies. See ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 2-46
to 2-47. The ANA must learn how to resolve their own issues and requisition
their own supplies through their own chain of command and requisitioning
system. See id. Only when a situation warrants intervention and after efforts
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al/intelligence-related (e.g., issues related to the Taliban, suspected threats, or foreign agents acting in theater). In these
instances, legal mentors should be prepared to provide ad hoc
advice, whether it is to the SJA, prosecutors, defense counsel,
or commanders. It is imperative, however, that legal mentors
never tell their principals what to do; advice should be given as
a suggestion, or even as a question, so the Afghans can claim
ownership of and responsibility for the final decision.75
As each OSJA develops, the SJA’s relevance to his respective
Corps Commander will increase so that eventually each OSJA
will be responsible for not only military justice matters, but also for rendering legal advice on administrative, fiscal, and operational matters.76
But mentoring is more than simply providing advice. It is also about developing relationships with the ANA. The job, in a
sense, is oftentimes more diplomatic than legal. This is part of
the reason mentors who aim to better engage their principals
must understand Afghan history and culture. When mentors
engage their principals, everyone in the OSJA feels empowered
knowing that they have their mentor’s support.77 Over time, a
sense of trust will develop between the mentor and his principals, which is crucial to the success of the mentor’s mission.
Trust, however, must be earned, not purchased by furnishing
material goods (an error committed in the past, for example,
with office furniture, wide-screen TVs, and vehicles) or making
shallow promises. The trust I refer to is only attained through
the development of an honest, professional relationship. Nevertheless, mentors must master the delicate balance between developing a trustworthy, professional relationship with their
ANA colleagues and fulfilling their primary duty of service to
their country.

have been exhausted through the normal ANA chain of commands should
mentors step in with assistance. See id.
75. In many instances, particularly with corruption cases, commanders or
ANA judge advocates will tell defendants that they do not want to prosecute
or investigate, but are being forced to do so by American advisors. Any perception of American influence on case disposition places the mentor into a
precarious position. It is better to make it known that decisions are made by
the Afghans and that mentors are there to provide suggestions and advise.
76. When I left the 207th in October 2011, the SJA was just starting to
review operational plans for legal sufficiency.
77. See RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK , supra note 16, at 276.
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B. Challenges when Mentoring the ANA
Evidently, mentoring has its particular challenges. Helping
to establish a functional, stand-alone, and credible military and
OSJA in the midst of an insurgency accompanied by terrorism,
criminal activity, and routine government corruption is one of
the greatest challenges any attorney could ever face. However,
knowing and understanding the challenges beforehand will
help Judge Advocates to adjust accordingly and succeed in this
challenging mission.
1. Ethnicity
Ethnicity presents an important type of cultural challenge.78
Ethnic issues are prevalent throughout Afghanistan and are
mirrored within the ANA. Working within an ethnically diverse ANA presents a unique and difficult challenge for legal
mentors because of the prejudices that exist among the various
ethnic groups.79
Afghans are historically a multiethnic people and devoutly
loyal to their tribal or ethnic affiliations.80 Consequently, ethnic
discrimination plagues all ranks of the ANA.81 Commanders,
and even those higher in the chain of command, often manipulate subordinates of differing ethnicity, while subordinates,
particularly the largest group—Pashtuns—likewise manipulate
commanders of minority ethnicity, such as Hazara.82
In the military justice context, ethnic discrimination appears
rampant. There have been examples of commanders issuing
non-judicial punishment (“NJP”)83 inequitably based on ethnic78. “An ethnic group is a large group of people with a common racial, national, tribal, linguistic, religious, or cultural origin or background.” Afghan
Culture, supra note 42, at 68. “Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups are defined
by language and origin, whereas sub-ethnic groups may be defined by religion, geography, history, politics, and/or tribes.” Id. at 69.
79. ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 3-4 to 3-5.
80. Id. at 1-2 to 1-3, 3-4 to 3-5. In Afghanistan, 42% of the population are
Pashtun; 27% are Tajik; 9% are Hazara; 4% are Aimak; 3% are Turkmen; 2%
are Baloch; and 4% are other. 80% of the population is Sunni Muslim and
19% is Shia Muslim. Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 19. These
groups are often referred to as tribes, although there are also subgroups within each of these groups. Afghan Culture, supra note 42, at 69.
81. ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 3-5.
82. See id.
83. A form of punishment given administratively by commanders for minor
military infractions.
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ity. In criminal justice matters more serious than NJP, commanders and even prosecutors have protected or obstructed investigations of soldiers because of ethnic allegiances. Ethnic
prejudice is also apparent when cases are detailed to prosecutors or when judgments or sentences are handed down by judges. Although most ANA leaders and soldiers will deny this discrimination exists, tribal or ethnic authority pervades the
ANA.
When cultural or ethnic discrimination is suspected, mentors
should try to instill national values and support for the rule of
law as paramount to ethnicity.84
2. Intimidation
Influence through intimidation has become an accepted practice in the ANA and presents another challenge for legal mentors.85 Those seeking to influence a particular individual might
intimidate that person directly or indirectly through threats to
his or her family.86 Although commanders, soldiers, or witnesses may want to do what is legally right, they are often constrained in their ability to do so because of fear for their or
their family’s safety.87
More often than not, intimidation is the reason many corruption cases or high-profile military justice cases are dismissed or
not pursued to their end. It is also usually why witnesses refuse to cooperate in investigations or testify at trials, critical
evidence is lost, or defendants are suddenly reassigned or disappear. This regrettable situation often leaves prosecutors with
no choice but to dismiss the case. Accordingly, mentors should
remain flexible and understand that intimidation may be the
primary reason some high-level matters are never pursued.88
3. Confessions
ANA prosecutors rely heavily on confessions to prove their
cases.89 This reliance, in large part, is historically and culturally based on Islamic law teachings whereby confessions made in
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 3-5.
Id. at 3-7.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 3-6.
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an open court before God are rarely challenged.90 With this in
mind, better-informed defendants, usually senior-ranking officials in high-profile corruption cases, will simply refuse to
speak, knowing that, as a result of this refusal, the prosecutors
or investigators will most likely abandon their case.
Fortunately, ANA prosecutors today are starting to trend
away from this past accepted practice, particularly as they develop their advocacy and case-development skills. Legal mentors can work with prosecutors on developing cases that do not
need confessions to succeed in court.
4. Illiteracy
Illiteracy presents yet another interesting challenge for legal
mentors, especially when training ANA soldiers on rules of engagement, laws of armed conflict, NJP, and ethics. On a larger
scale, illiteracy within the ANA negatively impacts the overall
U.S. mission in Afghanistan, albeit indirectly.
Although efforts are underway to increase the literacy rate,91
illiteracy and an aversion to writing among those who are literate has left the ANA with inadequate to almost-nonexistent
record keeping.92 As a result, many form-driven processes, such
as counseling statements, promotions, NJPs, and payroll records, which a U.S.-military trained Judge Advocate might take
for granted, have suffered. When routine paperwork is not
completed, soldiers might miss pay or promotions, or they
might be wrongly punished (or so they believe), leaving them
feeling disconnected and discouraged. These discouraged, unpaid soldiers might react by going AWOL, deserting, or joining
the insurgency. This, in turn, leaves the ANA undermanned,
poorly motivated, and generally unable to defend its country
against the insurgency, ultimately preventing it from effectively taking responsibility for the security of Afghanistan. Thus,
poor record keeping causes an unintentional domino effect
within the ANA, with the effect worsening as it moves down
the chain.
90. See Rashid Ahmad, Admission/Confession: A Comparative Study of
Islamic and Pakistani Laws of Evidence, THE CLUTE INST., 164–65 (Jan.
2011),
http://conferences.cluteonline.com/index.php/IAC/2011HI/paper/viewFile/65/6
4.
91. ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 2-41.
92. See id. at 2-45.
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While legal mentors cannot directly combat illiteracy within
the ANA, they can provide the OSJA with PowerPoint presentations and training that cover critical legal subjects and are
geared toward the illiterate ANA soldier.93
5. Leadership
Lack of experienced leaders possessing any formal military
training is another challenge to mentoring the ANA.
Prior to the recent efforts to build a new Afghan National
Army, there had essentially been no Afghan Army since the
Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, leaving many former mujahedeen fighters, warlords, and militia to serve as officers and
non-commissioned officers (“NCOs”).94 Many ANA commanders
and even SJAs got their positions through patronage, intimidation, bribery, or some other means of influence.95 This has resulted in many senior leaders with little to no formal education
or military training.96 For example, when I arrived at the Corps
to which I had been assigned, the SJA was not a lawyer or even
trained in the law. He was a former mujahedeen artillery battalion commander suspected by many throughout the Corps as
being corrupt. Fortunately, before the end of my term, the ANA
Judge Advocate General replaced him with a well-respected
former judge and law professor.
“This lack of training, combined with a promotion system
that favors influence peddling and patronage, remains an impediment to ANA leadership development.”97 Lack of experienced leaders poses a unique challenge for legal mentors trying
to instill discipline and respect for the rule of law within the
ANA.
6. The Soviet Model
The senior leaders in the ANA who have previous military
experience or training received it during the days of the Soviet
occupation, leaving a leadership model built largely on Soviet
93. See id. at 2-30.
94. Id. at 3-2.
95. Id. at 2-29, 3-8. It is not uncommon for senior officers to buy their position to eventually personally profit through extortion, bribery, and corruption. Id. at. 2-29.
96. See id. at 2-30, 3-8. Many leaders also consider training a waste of time
and instead rely on their militia experience. Id. at 3-8.
97. Id. at 3-8.
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military tradition.98 Under this system, NCOs have very little
authority or decision-making ability, if any.99 Because leaders
do not have authority and are not expected to make decisions,
they are not held accountable for the actions of their subordinates.100 This way, they remain in charge until something is
amiss, when they can then shift the blame to those beneath
them.101 Hence, leaders are reluctant to make recommended
changes, because enacting change means they take on the risk
of failure, whereas remaining with the status quo means they
can simply blame the underlying problem on someone else.102
In other words, under the Soviet model, leaders prefer to do
nothing, which poses a challenge for legal mentors looking to
effect change.103
7. Working with Coalition Partners
Legal mentors will often work with coalition partners, either
when serving as part of an OMLT, or when working alongside
coalition teams. Working with coalition members who have
their own priorities and cultural idiosyncrasies offers a new set
of challenges.
In Afghanistan, the country is divided into Regional Commands (“RCs”), with each RC commanded by a different NATO
commander.104 The coalition commander of the RC also usually
heads the OMLT assigned to the region. In addition, depending
on where the Corps is located, the battle-space commander, in
other words, the commander in charge of the particular RC or
portion thereof, may be a coalition commander.105 Thus, coalition members work in a number of settings in Afghanistan.
Afghans have definite perceptions of coalition members, some
positive, but many negative. Some perceptions may be historically based (as is the case with the British or Russians), while
others may be culturally or linguistically based. These perceptions may affect how Afghans interact with the legal mentor or

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See id. at 3-9.
Id.
See id. at 3-10.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2-29.
See KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 30.
ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 3-10.
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how the mentor addresses them, which could impact the entire
mission.
At other times, the mentor will need support from a coalition
or OMLT partner, but for one reason or another, it does not
come. Hence, legal mentors should remember that diplomacy is
just as important when working with coalition partners as it is
when dealing with Afghans.
8. Other Rule of Law Operators in the Battle-Space
In addition to the ANA legal mentor, there are other organizations conducting similar rule of law mentoring in the battlespace.106 Unlike ANA mentors, these operators work within the
civilian rule of law arena and may include the following: Brigade Combat Teams (“BCTs”), NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission (“NROLFSM”), the Department of State—Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(“DOS/INL”), U.S. Agency for International Development
(“USAID”), the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), Provisional Reconstruction Teams (“PRTs”), and the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (“UNAMA”).107 Since there may be
times when the legal mentors’ interests intersect with those of
the civilian operators’, or when information gained from these
operators located at the regional and provincial levels is helpful
to the legal mentors, getting to know them could prove beneficial.108
BCTs and NROLFSM are military-led and provide civilian
rule of law support. BCTs are co-located at the brigade-level
with their own rule of law personnel and routinely engage with
local civilian provincial and appellate judges.109 NROLFSM, on
the other hand, does not engage in rule of law advising, mentoring, or training.110 Instead, it coordinates civilian and military rule of law efforts with DOS counterparts focusing on five
main areas:

106. RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 200.
107. See id. at 199–204; Public Diplomacy Div., N. Atlantic Treaty Org.,
NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG.,
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_06/20110609Backgrounder-Rule_of_Law-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
108. See RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 200.
109. NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission, supra note 107 at 26.
110. See NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission, supra note 107.
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[1] Security—for civilian rule of law experts; [2] Coordination—to facilitate movements of the experts in conjunction
with other actors also working in the area in Afghanistan,
and to provide a liaison and outreach function; [3] Movement
support—such as secure convoys; [4] Engineering support—
for possible infrastructure upgrades at designated Rule of
Law facilities; and [5] Oversight of the contractual process—
in connection with the engineering support and in accordance
with current ISAF practices.111

The U.S. civilian agencies providing civilian rule of law support are DOS/INL, USAID, and DOJ. DOS/INL works and operates through two programs: (1) the Justice Sector Support
Program (“JSSP”), which provides regional training programs
and supports the Afghan Attorney General’s Office and the
Ministry of Justice, and (2) the Corrections Systems Support
Program (“CSSP”) which “supports the prison system, develops
corrections infrastructure, and provides training.”112 In addition, USAID supports the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, assists in reforming the law, and helps the Afghans draft legislation.113 Finally, “DOJ has the lead with the Criminal Justice
Task Force (the specialist counternarcotics task force), the Anti-Corruption Unit in the Attorney General’s Office, and the
U.S. Marshals Service protection efforts.”114
To a lesser extent, PRTs are also involved in rule of law efforts.115 PRTs “are civil-military organizations (CMOs) that are
staffed by U.S. government (USG) civilian and military personnel to assist foreign provincial governments with their reconstruction efforts; their security and rule of law efforts; and
their political and economic development.”116 While a PRT
might not have a coordinator dedicated to civilian rule of law
efforts (although this may change), “PRTs can contribute to
justice reform in Afghanistan [by b]uilding judicial infrastructure, [f]acilitating information-sharing (PRTs are popular with
111. Id.
112. RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 201.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 201–04. PRTs are the “principal vehicle to leverage the international community and Afghan government reconstruction and development programs.” Id. at 202. Currently there are twenty-five teams scattered
throughout most of the thirty-four provinces in Afghanistan; twelve are led
by the United States. Id. at 201.
116. See id. at 193.
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Afghan nationals, giving them good situational awareness),
[a]dvising on the best use of donor funds, [and h]elping to coordinate reconstruction efforts with the UNAMA.”117
Finally, of the various non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) conducting rule of law operations, UNAMA is most
prevalent,118 having its own mandate “to lead the international
civilian efforts . . . [and] to support and strengthen efforts to
improve governance and the rule of law.”119 Their usefulness
may depend upon the RC to which they are assigned.
Because there are so many organizations conducting rule of
law operations in the battle-space, coordination and unity of
effort is sometimes required. For instance, in Afghanistan,
ANA soldiers convicted to confinement may spend their term in
civilian prisons.120 As a result, there may be times when coordination between the mentor and the civilian rule of law counterparts (NROLFSM, CSSP, or JSSP) will be needed if a visit
to or information about a prison is requested. At other times,
coordination among the mentor and the agencies may be needed because the ANA and civilian authorities have concurrent
jurisdiction (e.g., when an ANA soldier commits a civilian offense off-post and off-duty, or if an ANA picks up and detains a
Taliban or al-Qaeda suspect, subject to the jurisdiction of the
National Directorate of Security).121
9. Working with Interpreters
An interpreter (or linguist) can be a mentor’s greatest asset.122 In fact, without an effective interpreter, the legal mentor
could find himself in trouble. Poor interpreters have led to
mentors being dismissed or discounted by their principals
simply because of poor translation or poor protocol. Advising
through an interpreter is a skill that must be developed.123 A
linguist with a lay background offers different capabilities than
one with a legal background. An “uneducated or otherwise un117. Id. at 204.
118. Id. at 200.
119. S.C. Res. 1868, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1868 (Mar. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49c9f9992.html.
120. MCPC art. 45; Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 19.
121. See Hill & Jones, supra note 8, at 14; Watts & Martin, supra note 9, at
6.
122. ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 3-4.
123. Id.
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sophisticated interpreter” can complicate a relationship and
potentially sabotage the mission.124
There are many legal terms that lawyers use as commonspeak that do not have equivalents in Dari or Pashto, the main
languages of Afghanistan.125 For instance, there are no Dari
words for defendant or plaintiff; nor are there words for misdemeanor or felony. Instead, the legal community in Afghanistan uses Arabic words just as we use Latin words in the English legal system. Other words do not have literal translations:
the Supreme Court is the “clean court”; when “charges” are referred, there is an “accusation”; an attorney does not dismiss a
case, he “exits” it. In one instance, an attorney intended to
speak of keeping a client’s confidentiality; however, the interpreter (who happened to have no legal background) translated
the idea as “keeping secrets from your client.” In this particular
example, one translation is an ethical duty, and the other is
ethical grounds for sanctions.
It is also important to use the same interpreter, especially if he routinely delivers quality services.126 In most instances, the ANA principals with whom mentors work will
have already developed a concurrent relationship with the interpreter from prior mentors.127 This prior relationship can
serve as a bridge for introductions and may even help curry favor.128
The SJA, his key staff, the judges, and key personnel in the
Corps (particularly senior leadership) should keep the interpreter’s cell phone number available, and vice-versa, in the
event someone needs to contact the mentor or the mentor needs
to schedule a meeting. A good Rolodex and contacts with key
ANA personnel is an essential element for success.129
There are several tips legal mentors should keep in mind
when using an interpreter. Mentors should speak to the person
addressed, not to the interpreter.130 Look at the addressee
when speaking. Make sure the interpreter only translates what
is said and nothing more. Keep sentences short to avoid over124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 227.
CIA, supra note 37.
RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 227.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 227–228.
ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 3-4.
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whelming the interpreter.131 Do not allow for adjustments, unless it is culturally necessary or something said is inappropriate. Also be careful as to word choice and using sayings which
are often not translated well or misunderstood. A good interpreter can help overcome these obstacles. The interpreter
should always advise if he hears or believes there may be a
dangerous situation. Do not curse or use profanity. Many Afghans understand some English, and if they hear profanity,
they may believe they are being insulted. Similarly, do not allow the interpreter to hold private discussions with the principals and do not hold private conversations with the interpreter
because it is considered impolite or even offensive unless the
discussion is translated.132 Finally, always speak clearly and
simply.
10. Conflicts of Interest
While gaining trust is paramount for success as a legal mentor, trust does not create a fiduciary relationship between the
legal mentor and his principal. In fact, legal mentors do not
have fiduciary relationships with any members of the ANA. As
such, no privileges flow from this relationship, and there
should be no conflicts of interest.
During the course of the deployment, legal mentors may encounter instances where information gained through the ANA
relationship must be compromised to Coalition Forces. If ever
in doubt, it is always best to consult with the IJC chain of
command, starting with the IJC SJA.
11. Corruption
Cultural challenges become especially frustrating considering
the epidemic high-level government corruption that may at
times seem a culturally-accepted means for conducting business.133 Corruption is one of the greatest concerns for gaining
stability in Afghanistan.134 Corruption permeates every level of
the ANA and Ministry of Defense.135 It is often rationalized be-

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 3-6.
RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 201.
ANA GUIDE, supra note 6, at 3-6.
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cause of the high risks and low pay for ANA soldiers.136 Many
in the ANA do not see it as a problem per se but rather as a
means of survival.137 Legal mentors who encounter corruption
should encourage commanders to conduct investigations.138
Discovering corruption is often harder than simply conducting an investigation, however, and investigations often present
their own challenges, including obstruction by commanders.
One method for discovering corruption is through observing
relationships and the seemingly casual discussions that may
flow from them. Thus, it is important for legal mentors to develop close, professional relationships with the SJA, the Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”) chief, the Inspector General
(“IG”) mentor, the hospital mentors, the Military Police (“MP”)
chief (and his mentor, if applicable), the finance mentor, the
Garrison Commander, the G2 Chief (and his mentor), the G3
Chief (and his mentor), the Brigade Commanders, and the
Corps Commander. Depending on the Corps, there may be other liaisons that may be of help as well.
To combat corruption, mentors should incorporate ethics into
discussions whenever possible, using analogies to illustrate
keys points.139 Lecturing should generally be avoided.140 One
legal advisor was particularly effective by equating corruption
with support for the insurgency, pointing out that every dollar
taken through corruption feeds the insurgency ten-fold, thus
diminishing ANA efforts.
Finally, the SJA should refer cases where senior commanders
are implicated to his higher chain of command, in particular to
the ANA Judge Advocate General, for guidance or referral of
charges. This way the SJA can avoid investigating the same
commander with whom he has, and may continue to have, a
professional relationship.
12. Logistics
In most instances, the ANA OSJAs lack adequate resources,
supplies, technology, and even paper.141 In fact, until recently,

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 3-7.
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most did not even have copies of the military codes, laws, or
regulations that one would expect to find in an SJA office.
Besides lacking equipment and supplies, most SJA offices are
not fully or well staffed either. Each OSJA has a manning requirement (or tashkil)142 that was designed for a much smaller
Corps. Cases frequently cannot be investigated or tried for lack
of investigators or investigator kits, defense counsel, or judges.
These logistical difficulties often affect investigations. For example, investigators might not be able to secure a crime scene
or preserve evidence because they do not have vehicles and
thus cannot get there fast enough. Unreasonable delays between the time an accused is incarcerated and the time he is
charged are also common because of these logistical challenges.
Logistical restrictions can also affect the legal mentor’s mission, particularly when needing to travel outside the perimeter
(e.g., visiting the civilian jail or meeting with ANP, civilian
judges, or politicians) because security concerns limit obtaining
vehicles and a security detail.
13. Insurgency
Finally, the greatest challenge for the mentor in the battlespace will be the insurgency. Meeting and addressing all of the
aforementioned challenges, and then some, while fighting an
insurgency is incredibly difficult.143
In addition to fighting an insurgency, there is the everpresent threat of infiltration of the ANA base.144 There have
been instances when units have been comprised of soldiers who
were former Taliban fighters, from pro-Taliban villages, or
compromised by intimidation, bribery, or corruption.145
Every day I mentored there was a continuous threat of an attack, whether from my principal, someone in his office, or
someone that had infiltrated the ANA compound. In fact, just
as I was arriving in theater, a mentor and several other coalition members were shot and killed by their ANA principal. I do
not know the specifics of the attack (a large part of the details
remain classified), but I do know that subsequent to those kill-

142.
143.
144.
145.

See id. at 2-19.
See id. at 2-15 to 2-16.
Id. at 3-7.
Id.
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ings, mentors remained on a heightened state of preparedness
when working with the ANA.
III. SOLUTIONS
A. Successful Practices
a. “Strive to understand the culture and the law, both in theory and in practice.”146 For Afghans, God, family, village, and
tribe all take priority before country. Learn the civilian civil
code and basic Shari’a law since both are relevant sources of
the ANA military justice code. Failing to know or understand
the history, culture, or law will be considered an exploitable
weakness. Learn how cases develop and how they are investigated; how the SJA reviews investigations and assigns cases
for prosecution; how prosecutors work their cases and draft and
submit a charge sheet; how the Court intakes cases and the effect of the Court’s review; how defense counsel investigate,
prepare, and work cases; and finally, learn and understand the
prosecutor’s, defense counsel’s, and court’s roles at trial.
b. Learn the pressure points of the ANA military justice system. These include the effect of ethnic relationships among the
victim, suspect, chain of command, SJA, and judiciary; the potential an accused, a witness, or a victim may be influenced by
one of his superiors; the level of corruption within the ANA military; the potential for intimidation by senior officials of prosecutors, military judges, CID investigators, and witnesses; and
the potential level of incompetence, particularly in the investigation phase.
c. “Establish and maintain strong, open, and trusting relationships,” not just with the ANA but also with the interagency, coalition, and NGO partners as well.147 Make a point to
meet with the other rule of law actors. By getting out and attending rule of law working groups outside the base, you will
gain valuable insight into how other actors operate in the rule
of law environment, in addition to gaining leverage for coordinating future rule of law efforts. There is no local rule of law
problem in a country with a national government developing as
quickly as Afghanistan’s. Any project that ignores the necessary relationships among foreign and host nation stakeholders
146. RULE OF LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 210.
147. Id.
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is bound to fail in the long run, if for no other reason than there
will be no national support to sustain it.
d. Similarly, get to know the key mentors and their principles, in particular the Corps Commander, Garrison Commander, Garrison tenant Commanders, G2, G3, Corps finance Chief,
IG, and MP Chief. The mentors can provide valuable insight
into ANA issues that are particularly relevant to the legal advisor and OSJA. At the same time, encourage the SJA to forge
his own relationships with the ANA principals and their mentors.
e. When giving advice or opinions, be clear and respectful,
providing rationale for your thoughts. Avoid giving rash advice
based on naiveté (which is part of the motivation for understanding the culture and history). When a dissenting opinion is
based on sound, rational reasoning, legal advisors will gain the
trust and respect of their principals.
f. Understand that an advisor’s “power” derives from the ability to pass along information and spot issues for senior-ranking
officials at both ISAF and the Ministry of Defense. This ability
should be used prudently. Do not threaten its use lightly. Seek
this avenue only when convinced higher echelons (at least on
the coalition side) will agree that the issue is sufficiently important to merit their intervention.
g. Keep matters simple.148 Pursue simple and practical systems for training and mentoring.149 Be honest and succinct and
try to keep meetings short. Rather than lecturing, mentors
should use analogies and discussion points to illustrate important points. Although “infrastructure and process are important,” the primary focus should be on the people through
“educating, developing, mentoring, and empowering” the
ANA.150
h. Words and word choice matter. Be careful what is said in
English. Be professional. Use appropriate language. Many Afghans understand English and words taken out of context may
be misconstrued.
i. Provide incentives for producing. Objectives should be offered to the ANA as a personal incentive. Remember where the
Afghan priorities lie (God, family, tribe). Consider how Af148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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ghans’ actions may be influenced by other factors, such as loyalties (e.g., “tribal, ethnic, religious, bureaucratic, financial”);
personal obligations (e.g., financial, or to their tribe, ethnicity,
or religion); and third-party influences inimical to the rule of
law (e.g., “corruption, poverty, foreign influences, crime, fear,
insurgency, lack of education”).151
j. Instill in commanders the necessity for following the rule of
law. Remind commanders to utilize the SJAs as the principal
rule of law advisors and also remind SJAs how they can minimize their own personal exposure for violations.
k. Remember the objective is not for the ANA to look like the
U.S. Army, but rather for the ANA to be a professional and
competent military organization in a form appropriate for Afghanistan.152
l. Utilize your own strengths to your advantage. Everyone
will approach the position and address issues from different
angles as defined by their prism of personal experience. Use
that past experience as leverage for accomplishing tasks. Do
not expect too much. Set realistic goals. The levels of bureaucracy in Afghanistan create an incredibly slow process, so patience is a pre-requisite for success.
B. Unsuccessful practices
a. Do not think you know everything. Remain flexible and
open minded. This is not Iraq and even if you have been to Afghanistan before, the landscape changes almost daily. Do not
try to go it alone by disregarding the expertise and experience
of others. Know, understand, and use, when applicable, all
available resources to your advantage. The mission is not new
and many of the issues you encounter have been previously addressed by others. Do your research before embarking on a new
quest. Besides the civilian rule of law operators, the Afghans
can provide a valuable resource. They have been here the longest and many, including your interpreter, have the institutional memory on how things have been done for your RC.
b. Failing to adhere to cultural prerequisites or etiquette or
disregarding cultural advice (e.g., from the linguist) can prove
devastating and has, at times, doomed legal advisors.

151. Id. at 160.
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c. Do not tell the principal what he “has” to do. Instead guide
them by asking questions, for example, have they done X or
thought of Y? This way they think of the issues and solutions
themselves and can take responsibility for the plan.
d. Do not promise things that may not, or cannot, happen. By
failing to deliver, credibility is lost and may not be recovered.
Rather, say that you will “look into it.” There is a perception
among Afghans that Americans promise but do not deliver.
Similarly, failing to follow-up on tasks or promises is another
means to lose credibility and trust.
e. Keep a professional attitude and do not let things get personal. Many suggestions will be ignored or disregarded. Understand why a suggestion was disregarded. Knowing the culture
and how things operate in Afghanistan and how tasks are accomplished may give better insight into how suggestions
should be made next time.
f. Do not undermine the SJA or anyone of authority in front
of subordinates.
g. You are not a fiduciary to the SJA or the judiciary. Despite
what some may think, you represent the United States and as
such your duty of loyalty and confidences run to it, not to the
ANA.
CONCLUSION
Key to U.S. policy for Afghanistan is training, partnering
with, and mentoring the ANA so it can self-sustain and be capable of defending its country from the insurgency that has beset Afghanistan for the last ten years. Developing the ANA
Corps OSJA into a self-sufficient legal office is a critical component of this policy. An OSJA capable of providing accurate
and timely advice for a well-disciplined Corps, and that respects the rule of law and complies with the laws of armed conflict and rules of engagement, will eventually be able to take
responsibility for the security of its respective region, which
will lead to the eventual withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces
from the region.
Judge Advocates deploying as ANA legal mentors will encounter many challenges unique to Afghanistan while fighting
an ongoing insurgency. Before deploying, Judge Advocates
should spend a significant amount of time learning and understanding the history, culture, law, and basic political framework of post-conflict operations and be ready to develop alli-
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ances with other legal rule of law operators in the region. It is
my hope that with this information, Judge Advocates deploying
as ANA legal mentors will be well equipped and prepared to
handle any of the challenges expected in theater.

